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Table of Contents

Preface .............................................................................................................................................. 5
   Boris Rumer and Lau Sim Yee

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 9
   Boris Rumer

1   Central Asia: The Geopolitical Context after the Iraq War ..................................................... 21
   Dina Borisovna Malysheva

2   China and Central Asia: The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) ................................................................. 51
   Kevin Rechard Hu

3   Russia and Georgia: Asymmetrical Neighbors ........................................................................... 77
   Aleksander Rondeli

4   A Promising Model of Local Governance for Kazakhstan ..................................................... 91
   Kanat Toleuvich Ospanov

5   The Basic Causes of “Dragging Out” the Transition Period ................................................ 99
   Vladimir Papava

6   Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan: Results of the First Decade of Independent Development ........ 113
   Stanislav Zhukov

7   Uzbekistan: A Liberalization of Trade? .................................................................................... 145
   Eshref Trushin
The Basic Causes of "Dragging Out" the Transition Period

Vladimir Papava

Basic Issues

The collapse of the communist regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR, along with the breakup of the latter, constitutes a fundamental historical event at the end of the twentieth century.\(^1\) All this can be regarded as a global process of transition to a market economy (for example, Berend),\(^2\) and in terms of magnitude it can be compared with the Great Depression of the 1930s,\(^3\) or with the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\(^4\) It is not surprising that the process of post-communist transformation has elicited the name "Refolution," as a synthesis of the terms "reform" and "revolution."\(^5\)

At the present time, scholarly literature and international practice have come to employ the terms "transition economy" and "transition period." With the goal of avoiding different interpretations (for example, the "transition" from a capitalist economy to a socialist economy in the 1920s in the USSR,\(^6\) or the transition

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\(^3\) V. S. Avtonomov, "Politich eskaya ekonomia perekhodnogo perioda," Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnoe otnoshenie, 1996, no. 9, p. 11.


from a market to a plan at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the new century), here the term will refer to the transition from an economy with a communist orientation to a market economy.

With the passing of more than a decade since the beginning of this historic process, by generalizing on the accumulated experience, it is possible to draw a number of very important conclusions about the path already traversed in transforming a communist economy into a market economy.

Notwithstanding the plethora of scholarly publications on the subject of the transition period, there are no generally accepted criteria for determining its completion. But the simplest formal (and indeed external) resolution of this question seemingly suggests itself: if the European Union recognizes this or that country with a transition economy, as ready to enter its ranks, then in all probability one should concede that the transition period in this country has been completed, and that its functioning economic system for all practical purposes has become market-based.

As is well known, acceptance of the majority of countries in Eastern Europe and the Baltics (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) has in essence already been decided. On the whole, one can interpret this to mean the completion of the transition period, that is, the period of transition to a market economy. In other words, these countries are "leaders" in passing through the transition period with success. Henceforth the discussion here will use the term "leaders" to designate these countries.

In the context of historical events, the agenda must include the question of the main causes of the procrastination in the transition period in the countries of that were not "leaders," that were "outsiders."

The logic of this problem appears to be rather simple: if the collapse of the communist system was essentially simultaneous in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR, it follows that initially all were basically in the same

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situation and, consequently, the dragging out of the transition period is an artificial delay in making reforms in the economy (and society more broadly). This all-inclusive answer itself contains many questions about the causes of the artificial slowdown in the process of reform.

As the key to understanding the principal problems of post-communist transformation in the countries of the outsiders, it is expedient to conduct a comparative analysis of these countries with the “leaders” described above.

Institutions of Statehood

The collapse of communist regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, together with the nearly simultaneous emergence of fifteen independent states in lieu of the USSR, placed new problems on the agenda. The resolution of these problems transcended the framework of those schemas that had already become classic and that had occupied the science of economics in the course of all its prior history. Hence economic scholarship proved virtually powerless to provide a theoretically grounded answer to such questions as: how should one make the transition from a planned to a market economy? It is not surprising that this process of transition, especially in its initial phase, proceeded under the well-known method of “trial and error.”

Against this background of the impotence of economic science to deal with the transformation processes, from the very incipience of the transition period one special circumstance–of great importance–was not taken into account: the presence of institutions of statehood. In particular, the states that were formed as a result of the collapse of the federal formations (above all, the Soviet Union and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and that were not the direct legal successors of these federal states lacked the institutions of statehood. As a result, from the very beginning their process of transition was compounded by the need to construct these institutions.11

101

101

101

Under these conditions, the implementation of economic reforms according to schemas that had counted on the utilization of the corresponding institutions of the state (which were lacking in these countries) was foreordained to failure. In all probability, the most graphic example of this point was the fiasco of the "shock therapy" that Georgia initiated from 1992—but did so in the absence of its own national currency.¹²

The advantage of the “leader” countries, compared with the “outsider” countries, was the presence of institutions of statehood. That significantly simplified and, thereby, accelerated the resolution of tasks associated with the transition to a market. Nevertheless, this factor cannot be deemed decisive in delaying the transition to a market in the “outsider” countries, for there are the examples of Croatia, Slovenia, and the Baltic countries. The latter were also “outsider” countries after acquiring independence and lacked their own institutions of statehood; their example refutes the thesis about the fundamental impossibility of a rapid transition to a market amidst the process of creating these state institutions. As for the success of Croatia¹³ or the Baltic countries¹⁴ in the matter of reforming their economies and, simultaneously, constructing the institutions of statehood, this is


102
above all explained by the targeted thrust of measures adopted by the reformist governments in these countries.\footnote{Jeffrey Sachs, *Reforms in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union in the Light of the East Asian Experiences* (Studies and Analyses, 39) (Warsaw: CASE, 1995).} This, in turn, is explained by the human factor, about which more will be said below.

### The Human Factor

The human factor, as a rule, has a decisive significance in practically any economic process. The character and possible success of economic reform in countries with a transition economy depend, to a large degree, on the behavior of the person who finds himself in a transition process from *homo soveticus* (i.e., someone who was formed under the conditions of a “command economy” and hence someone who was suppressed by the state and totally dependent on it)\footnote{See A. V. Buzgalin, *Perekhodnaia ekonomika: kurs lektii po politicheskoi ekonomii* (Moscow: Taurus, 1994), pp. 250-53.} to the type of person characteristic of a market economy, *homo economicus* (i.e., someone whose driving motivation is to receive the maximum utility in his household and the maximum profit in his firm). The latter type takes into account all the changes that have overtaken this category in the post-Smithian era.\footnote{V. S. Avtonomov, *Model' cheloveka v ekonomicheskoi naute* (Sankt-Peterburg: Ekonomicheskaia shkola, 1998), pp. 57-201; M. K. Bunkina and A. M. Semenov, *Ekonominicheskii chelovek* (Moscow: Delo, 2000).}

The type of person who carries out the process of post-communist transformation is characterized here by the term, *homo transformaticus*. That is someone who cannot completely emancipate himself from fear of the state and from the habit of living at the latter's expense. Such is the case even though he is gradually beginning to act on the basis of his own private interests to achieve maximum utility and profit.\footnote{V. Papava, “Doktrina rynchnogo ravenstva: voprosy teorii i ee prilozheniia k protsessu postkommunisticheskoi transformatsii,” *Obshchestvo i ekonomika*, 1999, no. 12; Papava, “The Georgian Economy: From ‘Shock Therapy’ to ‘Social Promotion’”; Papava, “The Georgian Economy: Main Directions and Initial Results.”}

Because of the fact that the communist regimes in “leader” countries ruled almost half as long as in the “outsider” countries, the type of person called *homo*
soveticus did not have time to develop fully. At the same time, homo economicus was not totally eradicated, as happened in the “outsider” countries at the end of the 1930s. Consequently, in the “outsider” countries homo transformaticus was dominated by the characteristic features of homo soveticus; by contrast, in the “leader” countries, it was the features of homo economicus that prevailed. It is precisely this difference that explains the greater readiness of homo transformaticus in the “leader” countries to undertake the transition to a market—in contrast to the situation in the “outsider” countries.

In economic activities, homo transformaticus acquires a special form, the roots of which go back to the economic system with a communist orientation (that is, a command economy).

Even under the conditions of a command economy, market mechanisms (more precisely, its individual components) all the same cannot be 100 percent excluded. It was so repressed by the state that it existed only in the “shadow” sector. Under the conditions prevailing in a command economy, not one director—with rare exceptions—in principle could run his enterprise without violating the laws that the regime had promulgated. Hence, in individual cases, this activity was linked to the “shadow” sector. Despite all this, under the conditions of a command economy, such directors did not become (and, in principle, could not become) entrepreneurs of a market type, for their behavior was bound by the political press of the existing communist regime. It is precisely this that can explain the fact that those enterprise directors who made use of elements of the market type in their behavior were called a deleks (“slick operator”) not predprinimatel’ (“entrepreneur”).

After the collapse of the command economy, in the majority of cases the former deleks knew how to preserve his position as a director in the state sector. And during the process of privatization, he exploited the so-called “rights of labor collectives” and became the owner of his enterprise. And, regardless whether he hired managers or not, especially in the initial phase of the post-privatization period, he endeavored to direct the activity of his enterprise by relying on the mentality

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19See, for example, A. N. Shokhin, Sotsial’nye problemy perestroiki (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1989), pp. 57-83.

of a deleks.

Just as homo transformicus is not yet homo economicus, nor could the former deleks—in the wake of the collapse of the command economy—be transformed into an entrepreneur. Homo transformicus in the entrepreneurial sphere acquires the title of “post-slick operator.” Because of the exclusively Soviet origin of this phenomenon, in English it is expedient to retain the Russian sound and use the phrase “post-deleks.” In terms of the orientation of their values, the post-deleks differs little from the values orientation of his “predecessor”—that is, the deleks of the Soviet era.22

Necroeconomics

The overthrow of the communist regime and the collapse of the command economy (against the background of the world market) stripped bare the economy of the post-communist countries. With some exceptions (in particular, some enterprises that produce hydroelectric power, oil and natural gas extraction, and the primary processing of raw materials), the goods produced in these countries proved unable to compete with world standards. That is either because of their low quality or high cost. The market for such goods does not exist and, in principle, cannot exist. An economy of this type, in our opinion, can be called a “dead economy,” or “necroeconomy” (from the Greek word nekros, meaning “dead”).23

The process of exposing the command economy can be characterized as an antonym to the term “investment”—that is, “divestment.”24 The latter term sig-

nifies the removal from the post-communist economy the pathology of a “misde-
veloped” economy.25 The result, in my opinion, is the formation of a necroeco-

Naturally, when some part of an economy is moribund, the remaining
part is viable. Provisionally, one can term the latter the “vital economy,” or “vita-
economy” (from the Latin word *vita*, or “living”).

The main question that needs to be answered is this: what do the necro-
economy and vitaecconomy have in common, and in what respects do they differ?

The necroeconomy, like the vitaeconomy, can produce goods. That is, in
practical terms, there can be “supply.” However, in contrast to the goods produced
by a vitaeconomy, there is no “demand” for the goods produced by the necroeco-
omy (because of their inferior quality or high cost). Consequently, the necroeco-
omy excludes any transaction of buying and selling. In essence, this precludes a
price equilibrium.

If a certain segment of the economy is moribund (that is, its survival is
impossible), then in principle there should not be any problem. According to com-
mon sense, a moribund economy cannot have any influence on its “vital” part.

Under the conditions of a market economy, this is precisely the way
things are. Uncompetitive goods just “disappear,” and in fact this does not create
any problems for the remaining part of the economy. This can explain the limited
nature of the research on economic theory in dealing with the problems of a market
economy, for the latter simply does not have, in principle, a necroeconomy.

The countries now undergoing the process of post-communist transfor-
mation find themselves in a fundamentally different position. In these countries,
the necroeconomy was formed on the basis of the material and technical founda-
tions of the former command economy.

For purposes of revealing the mechanisms of interaction, the necroeco-
omy and the vitaeconomy of the post-communist economies can be understood in
the following way:

1. The necroeconomy in the state sector
2. The vitaeconomy in the state sector;

25A. Lipowski, *Towards Normality. Overcoming the Heritage of a Central Planning Economy in Poland in
3. The privatized necroeconomy;
4. The privatized vtaeconomy;
5. The vtaeconomy, created by new private investments.

The first group, as a rule, includes primarily the large and medium-sized industrial enterprises. Based on the use for which their goods are intended, these are regarded as strategic. However, because their production is not competitive under market conditions, they are “dead.”

The main vtaeconomy in the state sector consists of enterprises that mainly produce energy (above all, the production and transmission of electric power and the extraction and delivery of natural gas and petroleum) or that are involved in transportation and communications. In the event of privatization, these shift to category four in the above list (i.e., as part of the privatized vtaeconomy). This group can also include certain medium-sized and primarily small industrial plants (prior to their privatization).

Category three includes enterprises from the first group after their privatization. The change in the form of ownership, by itself, has absolutely no effect on these dysfunctional enterprises, for the condition of the “corpse” does not change, whether it has form of state-owned enterprise or that of a private firm. To ignore this fact is the basic cause of the relative discrediting of the process of privatization. That occurred when, in its initial state, in isolation from the process of investment, the function of putting moribund enterprises to work was undertaken. This was done without regard to whether each concrete enterprise was really “vital” or “dead.”

The final, fifth category consists of the healthiest part of the post-communist economy. It has been newly created under the principles of a market economy and on the basis of private investment. Despite this fact, the fifth category also has certain problems that demand corresponding consideration. In particular, this concerns certain foreign investments. On the basis of such investments, post-communist countries do not attract the most modern technologies, but rather technologies that were in use earlier and, by world standards, can be regarded as obsolescent. The appropriate term for such technology, in my opinion, is the term “second-hand shop”; in Russian terminology, the corresponding term would be the stores that sell used goods, the komissionka. The products produced with these goods are
competitive only within the framework of emerging markets, and for a limited period of time (that is, until goods competitive by world standards are able to penetrate these markets).

The following question that arises for discussion is this: what causes the durability of the necroeconomy in post-communist countries?

One can find the answer to this question by drawing on the evolutionary theory of economic change.26

The basic “instrument” of this theory is the concept of “routines.” The latter refers to the rules and methods of conduct of firms that regulate their behavior and production.27 It should be pointed out that, in the Russian language translation, the term “routines” is often replaced that the word “stereotypes.”28

It is precisely the “routines” (formed in the course of many decades within the core of the command economy) are the main factor in causing the “dead” enterprises to work even though the command economy itself no longer exists. As a result, their warehouses are filled with uncompetitive goods. But, because in principle it is impossible to sell these goods, such enterprises pile up hopeless debts to the state budget, to the social sector, to the energy sector, and other enterprises. The result is the creation of a tangled web of mutual indebtedness of enterprises.29

According to the traditions established in a command economy, when an enterprise amassed debts (sometimes deliberately so), its director appealed to superior state organs (in the leading organs of the Communist Party, Gosplan, and Ministry of Finances) to write the debts off. As a rule, they achieved their goal. Given this situation (namely, the existence of a virtually unlimited, indeed guaranteed, possibility of writing off debts), the leaders of enterprises did not regard the accumulation of debts as something dangerous. This mechanism of writing off debts is the basic underlying “routine” that, unfortunately, periodically manifests

itself in post-communist countries in different varieties of a “tax amnesty.”

Of fundamental importance is the fact that precisely the “post-deletes” stands behind the necroeconomy—both in the state and in the private sectors. It is exactly people of this type who appear to be the initiators of behavior that corresponds to the routines of a command economy. The post-deletes, by making use of his connections, penetrates the state structures (both the parliament and the government), and with his influence endeavors to justify himself politically and to prolong the existence of the necroeconomy.

Without qualification one can say that the necroeconomy serves the interests of the post-deletes. And until such people are “replaced” (on the basis of the corresponding institutional reforms) by real entrepreneurs, the necroeconomy will always a solid base under it.

The obviously negative influence of the necroeconomy on the development of the “outsider” countries is beyond doubt. Consequently, it is necessary to expose and put into play that mechanism that is characteristic of a market economy and that will automatically resolve the problem of “dead” enterprises. In other words, this mechanism must ensure the universal application of market principles in the economic order. The key to solving these problems lies in the evolutionary theory of economic change cited above.

The government should devote special attention to the fifth form of the post-communist economy: the private sector created exclusively on the basis of private investments. The state should promote its consolidation and expansion; it should take steps to create a stable political and macroeconomic environment when new firms are created through private investments. It is necessary to bear in mind that the formation of “routines” in this group of firms continues to pose a great danger.

The main priority of the economic policy of the post-communist state should be to reduce the natural habitat of groups one and three by encouraging, at every level, the expansion of group five. In spite of the natural “unattractiveness” of those firms in group five that were created on the basis of “second-hand investments,” under the conditions of the existence of the requisite legal basis, it is practi-
cally impossible for these to become the source of a necroeconomy. That is because the formation of these firms derives from the principles of a market economy. As a result, if these lose their competitiveness, and if they are subordinate to market mechanisms, the corresponding “routines” of such firms ensure that they will simply disappear from the landscape.

As for the second and fourth groups, regardless whether the concrete firm still belongs entirely to the state or has already been privatized, it urgently needs to attract new investments by selling a corresponding share of its property or, at the very least, by transferring the rights of control for a long-term period to a strategic investor. In the contrary case, the probability will significantly increase for the vitaecconomy that the second and fourth categories will degenerate into the necroeconomy (corresponding thus to the first and third categories).

As noted above, privatization by itself does not lead to the eradication of the necroeconomy. Consequently, to ensure the viability of those enterprises in the first category that are deemed strategic in their purpose, the state has only one option: it must conduct an open international tender. The purpose here is to discover a strategic investor, who will be given the specific “dead” enterprise with the right to control it on a long-term basis. More precisely, that investor will not be “given” the enterprise, but rather the right to begin the corresponding production (whatever is deemed to be strategic for the given country) within the walls of the “dead” enterprise. One cannot exclude the possibility that this step may prove insufficient for the strategic investor. In that case, the state must proceed to the privatization of the given enterprise, even if sold at a nominal price, for the “dead” enterprise cannot be expensive.

As for the third group, the privatized necroeconomy, there are absolutely no favorable prospects whatsoever.

The sole correct assessment for the overwhelming majority of the material and machinery base of the necroeconomy is that this is nothing more than metal. Consequently, the eradication (in the direct sense) of the necroeconomy is possible by the direct sale of scrap metal (including export sales), for this export of scrap metal will give the owner a return in hard currency. In principle, this can be used to create the vitaecconomy.

The “routines” that correspond to a command economy are preserved, for
there is resistance to recognizing the fact that "dead" machines and equipment are nothing more than metal. The lack of such a recognition prevents (and at times encourages a ban) on selling these, especially for export. As a result, the necroeconomy continues to exist.

Theoretically, it is clear that an efficacious mechanism for destroying the necroeconomy is directly associated with the law on bankruptcy. The example of Georgia shows that, although the law on bankruptcy (the draft of which was prepared by foreign experts on the basis of world experience) was confirmed by the parliament several years ago, it unfortunately proved stillborn. In other words, it was a "necrolaw": not a single enterprise that is in fact bankrupt has been juridically recognized as such. This is explained by the fact that this law was not "inscribed" into the existing institutions in the country.

What happened with the law on bankruptcy in Georgia is a graphic confirmation of the fact that new institutions in post-communist countries, which were created under the pressure of international financial organizations (according to Western models through the conscious, direct imitation of Western originals)\textsuperscript{31} often prove unviable. And in the worst case, they can also precipitate negative effects. Here it is appropriate to recall that the International Monetary Fund is often subjected to well-grounded criticism because of its forced (and, simultaneously, simplistic) approach to institutional reforms. As a result of this, the process of establishing a market economy suffers.\textsuperscript{32}

Destruction of the necroeconomy is possible solely by creating institutions that can promote the process of post-communist transformation.

The fact that the "leader" countries have been recognized by the European Union as practically ready for admission to its ranks attests, in principle, to the fact that the necroeconomy does not exist in these countries. As for the "outsider" countries, the main cause of the delay in the transition to a market is the necroeconomy. That creates the economic basis for post-communist capitalism.

\textsuperscript{31}B. Shavans and E. Man’ian, “Postsozialisticheskie traktorii i Zapadnyi kapitalizm,” Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1999, no. 12.